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Introduction and aims  17 
 18 
Before the 1990s the ethics of research outside in the revised paper section medicine were 19 
guided largely by the researcher’s own morality and disciplinary guidance.  Research funders 20 
and universities often knew little of how researchers proceeded until the results had been 21 
published.  By the 1990s the legacy of wartime and medical tragedies had combined to create 22 
guidelines against which all research would be reviewed before it began.  In this paper we 23 
argue that current procedures for ethical review have drawbacks for researchers in the social 24 
sciences and provide incomplete protection for those to be researched.  Hence we propose a 25 
debate on the desirability of an alternative ethical stance for reviewing research, based on the 26 
work of Emmanuel Levinas.  27 
 28 
Research ethics and the social-science critique 29 
 30 
The history of research is punctuated by cases where the interests of those to be researched 31 
were subordinated to those of the researcher, with severe consequences for the former.  In the 32 
Tuskagee case, some black Americans between 1932 and 1972 were deceived into thinking 33 
that they were receiving free health care, whereas they were part of a clinical trial studying 34 
how untreated syphilis developed (Belmont Report, 1978).  In the Milgram case, participants 35 
were induced apparently to punish others when in fact they were unknowingly the subject of 36 
an experiment into obedience (Milgram, 1974). Serious issues of people’s rights being 37 
unprotected had emerged during the Nuremberg trials, especially regarding the Holocaust and 38 
medical experimentation.  These resulted in the Nuremberg Code of 1947 and the Declaration 39 
of Helsinki of 1964 (Leaning, 1996).  These focused on protecting people involved in 40 
medical research by obtaining their informed consent to participation.  Schüklenk (2000) 41 
argues that such protection is still less than total. 42 
 43 
One of the most important documents providing guidance on the meaning and practice of 44 
ethics is the Belmont Report, created under the National Research Act of 1975 (National 45 
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research, 46 
1979, Weinstein 2008). Although not legally binding, Institutional Reviews Boards have used 47 
the Belmont Report as their main source for advice on ethics in research involving humans 48 
(Weinstein 2008). Since its inception it has become a model document for other official 49 
guidelines across different national research boards and institutions. The main objective of 50 
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the Report was to ‘provide an analytical framework that will guide the resolution of ethical 51 
problems arising from research including human subjects’ (see Weijer 1999) and its influence 52 
has been far reaching. Three principles underwrite the Belmont Report: (i) respect for persons 53 
(autonomy), (ii) beneficence and (iii) justice.  54 
 55 
In the Belmont Report respect for persons is conceptualised as: ‘agents should be treated as 56 
autonomous agents, and […] persons with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection’ 57 
(Basic Ethical Principles, §2). An autonomous individual is defined as capable of deliberation 58 
about goals (Basic Ethical Principles, §3). The first principle comes into force through the 59 
guidelines provided for the process of informed consent: ‘respect for persons requires that 60 
subjects, to the degree that they are capable, are given the opportunity to choose what shall or 61 
shall not happen to them’ (Applications, §2). Beneficence consists of two components: ‘do 62 
not harm’ and ‘maximise possible benefits and minimise harm’ (Basic Ethical Principles, §7) 63 
recognising that harm may affect individuals or groups differently based on gender or 64 
ethnicity (Shore, 2006). In practice, this second principle is realised through the process of a 65 
risk-benefit assessment taking into account personal and wider societal norms and 66 
considerations (Shore, 2006). Often, beneficence is interpreted in a utilitarian sense, meaning 67 
doing the greatest good to the greatest number of people (Shore, 2006). Justice deals with 68 
‘who ought to receive the benefits of research and bear its burdens?’ (Basic Ethical 69 
Principles, §11). Benefits are often conceived as relating to distributive justice and the 70 
Belmont Report gives further details how to assess the just distribution of burdens and 71 
benefits. It distinguishes between justice at the individual level – where fairness is used to 72 
select who should participate in risky research and who can benefit from research – and at the 73 
social level. Here the principle of social justice is introduced to draw a distinction between 74 
classes of subjects ‘that ought, and ought not, to participate in any particular kind of research, 75 
based on the ability of members of that class to bear burdens on already burdened persons’ 76 
(Applications, §20).       77 
 78 
The main moral theory behind these three principles in the Belmont Report is Principlism 79 
(Weijer, 1999; Shore 2006) A prima facie principle is a normative standard deciding on the 80 
permissibility, rightness and obligatory nature of actions that fall within a principle but 81 
leaving scope to compromise, mediate or negotiate if needed (Weijer, 1999). Different 82 
normative standards can be used such as duty-based or consequentialist ethics, both clearly 83 
guiding the normative approach in the Belmont Report as discussed further later.    84 
 85 
The major complaints against the ethical approach in the Belmont Report can be summarised 86 
as a complaint against procedural ethics (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004; Rossman and Rallis, 87 
2010; Banks et al, 2013). Although applauded for protecting research participants, the Report 88 
has been criticised for being a checklist about the risks and benefits for the participants, 89 
confidentiality of data, consent and the use of plain language (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). 90 
The problem with this procedural approach is that the decisions taken by a research ethics 91 
committee are separated from what actually happens during the research. It has also been 92 
suggested that research involving humans creates an intrinsic moral tension. Following the 93 
Kantian maxim, moral philosophy fails in bio-ethics (and research involving humans) 94 
because it does not respect the autonomy of individuals: people should never be used as a 95 
means to someone else’s end (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). An individual’s decision should 96 
be led by his/her own interest and not the researcher’s interest. The solution is to let the 97 
participants co-own the project’s goals and not just be ‘subjects’. One or even the way of 98 
achieving this is through prior informed consent. In other words, the Kantian maxim of 99 
respecting the autonomy of individuals can explain the ‘tyranny’ of informed consent and the 100 
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obsession with the use of plain language in ethics review boards. Procedural ethics are thus 101 
the ruling force in Institutional Review Boards because they are perceived to be the best 102 
option for circumventing the intrinsic moral tension between respecting autonomy and 103 
research involving humans. This reasoning falls under the label of duty-based ethics. Another 104 
way of justifying rule-based ethics is consequentialist ethics drawing on the promotion of 105 
utility or well-being, values that are clearly embedded in the second principle of beneficence 106 
in the Belmont Report.  107 
 108 
The legacy of the Belmont Report in the USA was most quickly felt in the biomedical 109 
sciences. It then permeated into procedures for non-medical research in the UK, notably 110 
through the Research Ethics Framework from the Economic and Social Research Council 111 
(ESRC, 2005). There had been precursors in the UK from the Association for Social 112 
Anthropologists (1999) and the British Sociological Association (2002/4).  The ESRC set out 113 
ethical principles inspired by medicine, a review process with university ethical guidelines 114 
conforming to ESRC principles, and a checklist of requirements to be approved by a 115 
university Research Ethics Committee.  The focus was on informed consent, freedom from 116 
coercion and the avoidance of harm to participants.  While some medical-style safeguards 117 
may be ‘difficult or impossible to quantify or anticipate in full prior to the start of a social 118 
science research project’ and although ‘informed consent maybe impracticable or 119 
meaningless in some research’, nonetheless ‘the researcher should seek informed consent 120 
where possible’ (ESRC, 2005, p21).  However, An EU Code of Ethics for Socio-Economic 121 
Research took a more nuanced view with even key principles such as informed consent being 122 
couched in terms of multiple debates, dilemmas and context (Dench, Iphofen and Huws, 123 
2004, pp63–71).   124 
 125 
However, the near-universal adoption by universities of ethics committees that apply to all 126 
research those national ethical principles devised for medical research, has generated debate 127 
and criticism.  The American Anthropological Association (1998) stressed contingencies 128 
rather than universal principles in its ethical review of research. ‘It is understood that the 129 
degree and breadth of informed consent required will depend on the nature of the project and 130 
may be affected by requirements of other codes, laws, and ethics of the country or 131 
community in which the research is pursued.  Further, it is understood that the informed 132 
consent process is dynamic and continuous; the process should be initiated in the project 133 
design and continue through implementation by way of dialogue and negotiation with those 134 
studied’.  135 
 136 
Schrag (2011), Hammersley (2009, 2015), Stanley and Wise (2010), Colnerud (2015) and 137 
Dingwall (2008) have summarised other issues.  University research ethics committees may 138 
lack the disciplinary skills of the peer-review process and so may fail to appreciate the 139 
particuliarities of some disciplines and proposals. They may mandate general ethical 140 
principles that are unfeasible (Schrag, 2011; Monaghan, O’Dwyer and Gabe, 2013). Schrag 141 
(2011) argues that when committees spend their limited time resources on low-risk, social-142 
science research they are giving too little attention to, and so are harming, those in higher-risk 143 
science research.  Dingwall (2008) goes further.  The harm from social-science research is so 144 
limited that it is outweighed by the harm caused by researchers allegedly ‘playing the ethics 145 
review game’ – telling the committee what they want to hear, acting other than as approved 146 
or not doing necessary research, which would be a loss to society and academic freedom 147 
(Israel, 2014).  Haggerty (2004) and Stanley and Wise (2010) highlight ‘ethics creep’, both in 148 
the prescriptions in the ESRC’s ethics framework as it expanded from the 2005 version to the 149 
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one in 2010, and in the operations of ethics committees.  The definition of the ‘harm’ to be 150 
avoided is widening and the intensity of scrutiny increasing.  151 
 152 
Further criticisms focus on the distinctiveness of the social sciences – often field sciences less 153 
able to foresee or plan events than in a laboratory.  Ethnographers and anthropologists in 154 
particular have argued that their observational and narrative methods make the biomedical 155 
model particularly limiting (Atkinson, 2009; Smythe and Murray, 2000; Librett and Perrone, 156 
2010).  The latter argue that anonymity may be impossible, while Atkinson argues that ethical 157 
review is based on ethical protocols that ‘do not match the social realities that the researchers 158 
themselves want to explore’ hence ‘contemporary regulation of social science research is 159 
sociologically and anthropologically illiterate’ (p28).  Wiles and Boddy (2013) query whether 160 
biomedically based ethical review can deal appropriately with research based on children, 161 
longitudinal studies, e-research and the secondary analysis of data.  Crabtree (2013) makes a 162 
similar point regarding research on the experiences of vulnerable groups.  Arguing that ‘trust’ 163 
is critical for researching vulnerable people long term, Pirrie et al. (2012) note that trust is a 164 
concept that sits uneasily in the protocols of current ethical review. Colnerud (2015) and 165 
Hammersley and Traianou (2011) both also make the point that current ethical review is 166 
excessive in some areas and inadequate in others that are outside the law, even if the latter are 167 
ethically important and problematic.  Pollock (2012) makes a similar point on the potentially 168 
stifling effect of current ethical practices on the study of the vulnerable in the field, where 169 
microethics judgements are needed but disallowed.   170 
 171 
Overall, it is argued that risk-averse institutions are demanding ethical standards, inspired by 172 
a biomedical model of universally applied principles, within a narrow definition of ethics that 173 
is inappropriate for much of the social sciences.  Managerialism in universities and research 174 
funders requires risk management, documentation, the precise implementation of plans, and 175 
standardisation to achieve equity of treatment and auditability (McAreavey and Muir, 2011).   176 
 177 
The responses to the critique 178 
 179 
This critique has provoked responses that range from rejection to incorporating the critics’ 180 
points in an improved ethical-review system.  The strongest defence of prospective (i.e. pre-181 
research) ethical review is from London (2012). He does not accord any research an opt-out.  182 
He shows why the benefits of prospective ethical review are real but hard to measure.  The 183 
preparation for review weeds out poor proposals before submission.  Inexperienced 184 
researchers are helped to learn the rules. He and Klitzman and Appelbaum (2012) 185 
acknowledge the dangers of committees nit-picking good proposals to show they are doing 186 
something.  Hedgecoe’s (2008) ethnographic study of research ethics committees failed to 187 
show any bias against, or misconstruction of social-science research.  Jennings (2012) 188 
disputes that social-science research is always intrinsically low risk in terms of harm to 189 
participants.  He contrasts the attempts at standardising NHS ethical-review processes with 190 
the lack of quality control over the university equivalents.  Bond (2012), like Jennings 191 
(2012), accepts the force of Schrag’s (2011) points and proposes reforms to avoid committees 192 
being hijacked by excessive concerns for remote contingencies in social-science research, 193 
while maintaining public trust (a point London (2012) also makes).  His recommendation for 194 
improving ethical review for the social sciences is to focus less on harm reduction (often with 195 
an ever-widening definition of unlikely forms of harm) and instead to focus on rigour, respect 196 
and trust. Chenhall, Senior and Belton (2011) provide the anthropologist in the field with 197 
some practical ways of dealing with issues of consent, standardised guidelines and 198 
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unexpected ethical dilemmas, while remaining within the principles used by research ethics 199 
committees. They stress the need for reflexivity, microethics and respect for local conditions.   200 
 201 
Insights from research in various contexts and cultures 202 
 203 
Many researchers working in different contexts and cultures have reported additional 204 
concerns about the practicality and appropriateness of the ethics codes debated so far in this 205 
paper. The first problem is that researchers are unclear how to react when unforeseen ethical 206 
issues arise in the field (as they often do) when the structure of ethical review is based on 207 
prospective review and approval.  A further review of revised plans may be impracticable.  208 
Simply reporting afterwards changes of ethical importance is easy for the researcher but may 209 
devalue the ethical-review process.   210 
 211 
The second set of issues is practical.  How do you obtain informed consent if the local 212 
language does not contain words that are the equivalent in meaning to those one would 213 
normally use in, say, English, e.g. ‘placebo’ (Krosin et al., 2006)?  How do you record 214 
informed consent in a pre-literate society?  Many sheets with crosses prove nothing though 215 
they meet the procedural requirement.  How do you persuade people to sign a consent form 216 
when they fear signing anything in case of negative repercussions?  If ‘research’ in general is 217 
viewed with suspicion, and if some people are less willing to answer truthfully questions on 218 
sensitive topics (Bleek, 1987), then the cultural underpinnings of ‘consent’ for ‘research’ are 219 
very different.  From whom should consent be obtained in societies where absolute individual 220 
autonomy is not the norm – from the community leader, the husband, the individual or from 221 
all of them, each having a veto (Agulanna, 2010; Adu-Gyamfi, 2014)?  And can the 222 
individual realistically be autonomous and refuse when their elders agree? 223 
 224 
These concerns lead on to a much wider debate over cultural imperialism (or objectivism) 225 
and cultural relativism.  Should ‘Western’ ethical standards and procedures be imposed on 226 
everyone everywhere because they are the best – even if ‘gold standard’ only by Western 227 
norms – and because they sit comfortably with Western researchers, funders and institutions? 228 
Or should ethical practice be tailored to local norms?  This can become a rather sterile 229 
dualistic debate lacking an agreed resolution.  Corradetti’s proposal (2009) for a ‘universal 230 
pluralism’ may be a way forward – the essences of both full universalism and relativism 231 
being combined – or it may satisfy no-one. 232 
 233 
The final concern raised by some researchers is the disquiet expressed by potential 234 
respondents over whether the research will benefit them (Benatar, 2002).  Will their health or 235 
standard of living be improved, or will the information gathered from them – their responses 236 
or samples – be taken for analysis elsewhere by researchers they will never see again, leaving 237 
them no better off?  Who, in short, is the research for – the researcher, those researched or 238 
both?   Do we need a new ethics for research (Benatar and Singer, 2010; Chenall, Senior and 239 
Belton, 2011)? 240 
 241 
An alternative research-ethics framework: the ethics of Levinas 242 
 243 
‘Research’ is generally seen as the ‘production of knowledge’, which is conducted within an 244 
ethical framework based largely on a biomedical model that prioritises non-maleficence 245 
(doing no harm, primum non nocere) and leans strongly towards the universal application of 246 
Western ethical principles irrespective of the cultural or disciplinary setting in which they 247 
will be applied.  The unpredictable and diverse processes of fieldwork may require a 248 
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renegotiation and reconsideration of ethics in the field and hence a revised ethics committee 249 
approval, yet this is often impractical in the current one-stage, pre-research, review system.  250 
The current approach is consequentialist – ensuring the least harm to the greatest number – to 251 
be achieved deontologically by research ethics committees carrying out their prescribed legal 252 
and administrative duties and procedures.  The protection from harm and financial or 253 
reputational penalty is, first, for the defence of the researcher, their institution and the 254 
research funder and only then for the individuals and communities being researched. Their 255 
protection is assumed to follow unproblematically from the initial ethical review.   256 
 257 
Since the Belmont Report, social-science research has become far more reflexive and critical. 258 
Institutional review boards have been deemed out of tune with this demand for a non-violent 259 
transformative ethical consciousness (Lincoln and Cannella, 2009). While acknowledged for 260 
regulating procedural ethics, they have been criticised for an inflexible approach which sits 261 
uncomfortably in an era when research has come to be about understanding complexities and 262 
power structures. Institutional review boards have become places where regulations are 263 
enacted by elites far removed from the practices of research and hence ill placed to address 264 
the unheard voices of research participants (Cannella and Lincoln, 2004). The Belmont 265 
Report is too focused on regulating a vertical and hierarchical relationship between the 266 
researcher and what it refers to as ‘research subjects’ (Shore, 2006; Lincoln and Cannella, 267 
2009). Ethics in institutional review boards has been criticised as being a symptom of the 268 
neoliberalisation of research (Cannella and Lincoln, 2007). The dominance of a Kantian 269 
approach has led to an ethical approach that intensifies an individualistic ethical framework. 270 
Ethics may need to adopt a relational approach between researcher and researched, both 271 
learning how to treat others equitably through dialogue and negotiation (Guillemin and 272 
Gillam, 2004; Cannella and Lincoln, 2007; Emmerich, 2013) 273 
 274 
There is a radical alternative approach to research and research ethics that puts virtue ethics 275 
and the wellbeing of those to be researched – their unheard voices and unseen faces – at the 276 
heart of research.  This is based on the work of the philosopher and Jewish theologian, 277 
Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995).  In his two major works – Totality and Infinity (1961) and 278 
Otherwise than Being (1974) – he outlines a theory of ethics that moves away from 279 
individuality and ego and suggests an ethics of alterity – an ethics for others. Unlike 280 
utilitarian and consequentialist ethical approaches, which emphasise rule-based methods, a 281 
Levinasian research-ethics strategy rejects an ethics of moral rules (Manderson, 2006).  For 282 
Levinas, ethics is a responsibility to other people that is involuntary and singular. ‘The 283 
demand of ethics comes from the intimacy of an experienced encounter, and its contours 284 
cannot therefore be codified or predicted in advance’ (Bauman, 1993 in Manderson, 2006 285 
p.8).  In contrast to a Kantian moral framing based on rules, Levinas argues that ethics is 286 
about interpersonal relationships, not abstract principles; for him, an ethics based on universal 287 
first principles is a contradiction in terms.   288 
 289 
For Levinas morality must be sought in what is Good but the problem is that the judgement 290 
of what is Good necessarily involves others who are distant from the individual and outside 291 
the scope of ontology. An inherent egocentrism towards individuals is at the heart of 292 
traditional ontology; for Levinas, to be means to be stuck in one’s own being.  Levinas reacts 293 
strongly against this singular and totalitarian approach and looks for the Good beyond one’s 294 
being and finds it in the ‘face of the Other’.  The Other has its own dignity and therefore can 295 
demand to be respected; the face of the Other breaks down singularity and humanises the 296 
Self.  The appeal of the Other to be ‘loved’ is so powerful that the Self becomes detached 297 
from its own being.  A Levinasian research ethics would shift the focus from researchers as 298 
7 
 
the guardians of a superimposed code of personal ethics to people who are obliged towards 299 
the Other (Hay, 1998).   300 
 301 
Both Levinasian and Kantian approaches to research ethics highlight the importance of 302 
showing respect for others. While the Belmont Report calls for ‘Respect for Persons’, 303 
Levinas requires ‘Respect the Other’. Autonomy is one of the most important principles in 304 
the Belmont Report. Autonomy and the idea of self-determination are central characteristics 305 
of the good life and in the Belmont Report we find a Kantian approach towards autonomy 306 
through, for example, the notion of a free decision to participate in research: the researcher 307 
does not coerce participants. Levinas’s philosophy, on the other hand, is driven by the idea 308 
that heteronomy replaces autonomy, arguing that the subject (the researcher) must be 309 
subjected to the Other (the participant).  310 
 311 
Levinas criticised Western philosophy for being focused on autonomy and ‘totalising’ (i.e. 312 
rejecting difference), for avoiding the complexity of reality and so being incapable of 313 
addressing our relations with others.  Levinas contrasts this ‘autonomous philosophy’ and its 314 
continual return to the ego of the Self, with his ‘heteronomic philosophy’ that is based on the 315 
Other. The trope that Levinas employs to describe the encounter with the Other is the ‘face’.  316 
In the chapter Ethics and the Face in Totality and Infinity Levinas (1961) uses the example of 317 
how the hunger seen in the face of the Other calls out to the Self.  It is the proximity of the 318 
face that arrests the Self, even inducing paralysis (Bernasconi, 1995; Hofmeyr, 2007).  “In a 319 
world of hunger, I am an oppressor” (Levinas 1961 p.200). The vulnerability experienced in 320 
the face of the Other commands a response from the Self. It is the face of the Other that 321 
allows a self-discovery through the ‘pain’ of the Other (Manderson, 2006).   322 
 323 
Levinas explains the infinite responsibility of the Self for the Other through the concept of 324 
proximity which is understood by Levinas as implying simultaneously closeness and distance. 325 
The Other can be approached but is never reached.  This ambiguity leads to infinite 326 
responsibility. Therefore our difference and distance from others indicate that it is impossible 327 
to cement our responsibility towards the Other in rules, logic or knowledge about the Other.  328 
Proximity, for Levinas, is about emotions, the body and the experience in the moment and 329 
that experience is not an abstract idea. In Levinasian ethics, a research relationship can be 330 
ethical only if its characteristics are not predetermined.  If institutionalised ethical practices 331 
are centred round a standard contract setting out the parameters of an ethical relationship 332 
prior to an encounter with the Other, then they are the opposite of an ethical relationship.  333 
 334 
For Levinas, the free will or autonomy of the participant is not guaranteed through the 335 
principle of prior informed consent; rather the opposite is true. By consenting to the research, 336 
the autonomy of the participant is violated because actions are driven by the researcher. 337 
Levinas criticises Greek philosophy because it protects the free will of the Self by 338 
neutralising the will of the Other who is ‘captured’ by the self. The justification for informed 339 
consent is that it protects free will and autonomy, and protects against deception and coercion 340 
(Kristinsson, 2009). Yet questions can still be raised about whether it can overcome the 341 
power relations embedded in research practices, despite the best of intentions. Levinas 342 
proposes the opposite – a research ethics ruled by the Other that can address the power 343 
relations and the other complaints against universal procedural ethics. Contrary to the 344 
Belmont Report, the starting point of a Levinasian ethics is a position of responsibility for the 345 
Other rather than starting from the position of autonomy. A Levinasian ethics can respond 346 
better than the Kantian approach to the call for social-science researchers to be more radical, 347 
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egalitarian and anti-colonial because Levinas’s starting point as first philosophy is 348 
heteronomy and not autonomy.   349 
 350 
Anthropologists and ethnographers have found a Levinasian research ethics more appealing 351 
because it provides a framing that allows them to respond in the field to the demands of their 352 
research participants (Metro, 2014).  Pre-formulated consent practices lose meaning once the 353 
ethnographer is confronted with unique situations set in local practices, vocabularies and 354 
customs.  Ethnographers question whether everyone shares the capacity for autonomous 355 
decision-making (Benson and O’Neil, 2007; Metro, 2014). They contest the validity of a 356 
Cartesian model of subjectivity based on the principle that all individuals are autonomous and 357 
make rational decisions about how to interact, guided by a common belief in the universal 358 
principles of democracy and freedom.  The consent form, they argue, should not be a 359 
straightjacket but should be the part of the research process that sets out the conditions for a 360 
relationship that should evolve once the research has started.  361 
 362 
The requirement of flexibility is another reason why a dialogue with Levinas matters. This 363 
relates to the distinction between procedural and practical ethics. From a procedural 364 
perspective the current practice in institutional review boards may be adequate to deal with 365 
informed consent, confidentiality, rights to privacy, deception and protecting human subject 366 
from harm (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004). However, all researchers recognise that they will 367 
encounter tricky moments in the field. In the literature this is identified as situational ethics, 368 
referring to moments that are unexpected (Fletcher, 1966; Ellis, 2007). It is their 369 
unpredictability that makes them ethically important because, being unanticipated, they have 370 
not been discussed in institutional review boards. Nevertheless, these ethical moments still 371 
need a modus operandi. Ethics in practice, situational ethics or micro-ethics all refer to the 372 
unexpected moments in the field that demand an ethical reflection and action.  373 
 374 
General rules and principles agreed in institutional review boards may not be helpful because 375 
the tricky moments usually occur as part of daily life during fieldwork (Banks et al 2013). 376 
This requires an ‘ethical sensitivity to see the ethical salient features of situations and 377 
relational virtues such as trustworthiness’ (Banks et al, 2013: p. 266). Virtue ethics and an 378 
ethics of care are often the primary moral drivers for such an engagement and such 379 
relationships come with responsibilities (Ellis, 2007; Rossman and Rallis, 2010; Banks et al, 380 
2013). An ethics of care is based on the principles of mutual respect, dignity and 381 
connectedness. However, it is often part of a longer-term relationship and not all ethical 382 
moments present themselves between the researcher and the so-called research subjects. 383 
Often the trickiest moments occur during random encounters with those outside the approved 384 
research plan. An ethics of care is relational and therefore an improvement on individual-385 
based ethics. But the starting point is still driven by the researcher: s/he decides how to relate 386 
to the participants (Rossman and Rallis, 2010). An ethics of care requires the researcher to act 387 
with ‘hearts and minds’ (Slattery and Rap, 2003 in Banks et al, 2013). The danger is that the 388 
ethical moments in the field are seen as just dilemmas and the researcher follows her/his 389 
instinct. But for a reasoned moral decision, guidelines are needed on how to negotiate 390 
relationships as a precondition for ethical behaviour (Guillemin and Heggen, 2009). Ethical 391 
mindfulness is not a choice that should be left to the researcher on the spot. In a Levinasian 392 
approach it is no longer the researcher taking the decision on how to care for the Other: it is 393 
the Other demanding that the researcher fulfil their responsibility to look after the Other.  394 
 395 
This alternative approach should nourish the relationship between researcher and participants 396 
based on an intersubjectivity that allows the researcher’s Self to explore multiple forms of 397 
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being through a discursive engagement with the Other (the research participant).  Instead of 398 
giving a fixed meaning to an ethical relationship through a previously arranged consent form, 399 
an ethical relationship should emerge through dialogue during the research.  What counts as 400 
ethical behaviour must not result from a monologue, because meaning does not reside only in 401 
the speaker.  Language is interactive and meaning is formed through the interaction between 402 
the speaker and listener.  Research ethics, for Levinas, should not be based on an assumption 403 
of shared meanings and understandings captured in a universal language of prior informed 404 
consent, but rather research ethics should ‘become vehicles of constant semiotic negotiations’ 405 
(Metro, 2014 p.178; Hill et al, 2010). As Judith Butler (2005) argues, a Levinasian ethics 406 
prevents totalising knowledge of the Other, that is, a systematic reduction of the Other 407 
(l’autre) to the same (le même). Extending this line of thinking, contract-based consent forms 408 
assume that all parties share the same meanings, language, priorities and understanding of 409 
research. However, as Sakai (1997) argues, a dialogical process is ‘heterolingual’, meaning 410 
that even with a common language researchers should act as though they are addressing a 411 
‘foreigner’ because it would be unethical to predict the ethics or understandings of the 412 
research participants.  413 
 414 
This makes for us a Levinasian ethics distinct from an ethics of care based on trust, friendship 415 
and long-term relationships. Even researchers who whole-heartedly embrace the principles of 416 
ethics of care, still question how far their responsibility towards the other should reach 417 
(Ritterbusch 2012). The reflections about positionality, caring after the fieldwork, reciprocity 418 
and considerations of participatory research are inadequate in a Levinasian ethics. For 419 
Levinas, we tend to totalise (simplify) the Other in one of two ways. Either we totalise them 420 
by keeping their strangeness at a distance and using a discourse that emphasises the 421 
differences and separation from us and defines the Other solely by their difference from us – 422 
a form of relativism.  Or we totalise the Other through discourses that accentuate sameness 423 
and union – a form of universalism (Manderson, 2006).  We condemn the Other either to 424 
remain outside our comprehension because of their strangeness or we reduce the strangeness 425 
to sameness so that the Other becomes comprehensible.  For Levinas, the former mistake is 426 
part of a tradition of deontological liberalism or a philosophy of rights in which the integrity 427 
and uniqueness of the Other is preserved and kept at a distance because its distinctiveness.  428 
The latter mistake is part of a tradition of teleological liberalism or utilitarianism as it 429 
preserves the equality of others to the Self because we share values and norms across society 430 
as a whole.  Both use the Self as the starting point to build knowledge and this severely limits 431 
our opportunity to understand the Other because we either reduce everything to the same as 432 
us or to something wholly different.  Totalising others in either way is unethical for Levinas. 433 
 434 
This totalising process prevents us developing valid ethical relations with others.  For 435 
Levinas, proximity is not physical closeness; it is a trope introduced by Levinas to convey 436 
responsibility. The proximity of the Other destabilises and decentres the ego. The presence of 437 
the Other excites us; it creates an obligation.  The proximity of the Other makes us more 438 
aware of ourselves.  However, from a Levinasian perspective, proximity is not only a social 439 
relationship. It is deeply physical; it is a sensation and an experience.  Levinas refers to the 440 
excitement of the skin, like a blush when we are touched by the Other (Manderson, 2006 441 
p.102).  Writing from his own experience of the Holocaust, Levinas invokes the memory of 442 
those who were closest among the six million assassinated by the Nazis (Levinas, 1974 p.v).  443 
He clearly feels a unique and un-substitutable responsibility towards the victims of the Shoah.  444 
The proximity towards the Other raises an expectation of responsibility which is 445 
“unexceptionable […] preceding every free consent, every pact, every contract” (Levinas, 446 
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1974 p.114).  How does this responsibility relate to research ethics and how does it go above 447 
and beyond an ethics of care? 448 
 449 
The best way to describe this is the paralysis encountered during fieldwork by Vermeylen in 450 
Namibia, Botswana, Uganda, Ghana and Zambia over more than a decade. Most papers refer 451 
to ethical moments in the field directly related to their interactions, friendships and changing 452 
relationships during the fieldwork with their research participants. The encounters recalled 453 
here are those with ‘strangers’, people whom you meet in everyday life: at the bus stop, in the 454 
marketplace, or just passing by in the streets. Most of these fleeting moments were positive 455 
encounters but there have also been instances were patience was lost, distrust crept in and 456 
frustration was experienced. Sometimes someone hides the truth, spins a good story to make 457 
you feel guilty or provokes you to do unanticipated things. How can a Levinasian ethics help 458 
with these tricky moments? It may seem easier to get out of the situation if it is a stranger, but 459 
there are moments when close research collaborators and participants have behaved 460 
deceitfully or unethically. Will feelings of trust, friendship and ethics of care still give 461 
guidance now? These tricky moments paralyse researchers and only the face of the Other, the 462 
stranger will tell the researcher what they can and must do.  463 
 464 
According to Levinas, the vulnerability experienced in the face of the Other commands a 465 
response from the Self, but not to impose, possess or assimilate the Other.  It is the Other’s 466 
face that allows a self-discovery through their ‘pain’ (Manderson, 2006).  Although in 467 
Totality and Infinity (1961) hospitality is the welcome given to the Other who calls upon the 468 
Self to respond, it is still a host-guest relationship.  In Totality and Infinity (1961) Levinas 469 
stresses the strangeness of the stranger that results in the Self being questioned and 470 
questioning him/herself in the face of the stranger.  In Otherwise than Being (1974) this 471 
relationship becomes more risky as the host (the Self) may become hostage: not all 472 
encounters with the Other are benign. For Levinas this danger is a necessity as ‘it is in the 473 
condition of being hostage that there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon and 474 
proximity’ (Levinas 1974, p.117).  This shift is achieved through changing the positioning of 475 
the Other who is now close to the Self – a neighbour now whom one should not avoid.  476 
Because of the Self’s infinite responsibility towards the Other, the Self hosts the demands of 477 
the Other but equally is held hostage by these demands.  The feeling of being a hostage to the 478 
vulnerability of the Other is at the core of consciousness, as it is for a child or parent.  The 479 
infinite demands of the Other cannot be anticipated, may surprise us, may not be welcome 480 
but they are inevitable and therefore unpredictably difficult (Manderson, 2006).    481 
 482 
A stronger challenge is being called upon to act when the norms encountered in the face of 483 
the Other are perceived as unethical.  However, for Levinas the face indicates a relation of 484 
responsibility but he does not use it to give us specific moral obligations (Minister, 2012).  485 
The face does not reveal actual moral obligations or actions, but the ‘practical demands [from 486 
the face] are derived from an interpretation of the possibilities for destitution within human 487 
existence’ (Minister 2012, p.207).  For Levinas, an ethical relationship is characterised by a 488 
close relationship between justice and forgiveness. Justice ‘is called into being by this very 489 
mercy with a concern to recognise all the others…’ (Levinas, 2001, p.230 in Slaughter, 2007, 490 
p. 50). The Self still has to use their judgement dictated by the vulnerability of the Other to 491 
choose the right response that meets Levinas’s conception of an ethical relationship in the 492 
particular circumstances. 493 
 494 
A Levinasian ethics asks us to think about ethics well beyond a rule-based duty in a specific 495 
research project. Particularly within the context of research projects in the global South, the 496 
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purpose of research may be questioned. Is it only about generating knowledge and advancing 497 
science and careers or are wider issues at stake? Can and should research be about the needs 498 
of others and part of a restorative process after the injustices of totalising discourses (Young, 499 
1990)? These are questions not usually considered in current ethics committees but they are 500 
precisely pointing out the responsibility Levinas is arguing for.  501 
 502 
Applying a Levinasian ethics to social-science research implies a scepticism towards standard 503 
ethics forms, prior informed consent and other codified institutionalised rules based on pre-504 
research (prospective) planning.  Ethics is part of a general motivation to feel responsible for 505 
injustice.  Ethics raises issues about the wider role of universities in society and the research 506 
they are facilitating.  So far, this sense of responsibility can remain tucked away either in the 507 
unreported details of fieldwork or buried in our consciousness. Tricky moments of frustration 508 
or apathy can be airbrushed in fieldnotes, but for Levinas these are precisely when we should 509 
show our humanity and feel responsible for the wider injustices. On a personal note, there are 510 
moments when we have felt the urge to ask for forgiveness, as white, well educated 511 
Europeans. However often we asked for consent and recorded it, we remember the moments 512 
when we should have not shirked our responsibilities. We could have done more. Nobody has 513 
ever asked us where we have fallen short in the field, where we have avoided a request to 514 
help, where a blind eye was turned to someone who needed help. We could not have helped 515 
all who asked, but after engaging more deeply with Levinas’s work it feels wrong to have 516 




What makes Levinas’ work distinctive is his idea that ethics should be the first moment in 521 
philosophy and hence in any research environment and not an afterthought or last-minute 522 
procedure. For Levinas, ethics is one’s responsibility for others.  It is not just situational, but 523 
is a “constitutive form of the human condition” (Benson and O’Neill, 2007 p.44). This means 524 
that the researcher’s responsibility towards research participants is not based on reciprocity: 525 
the research participant can never be responsible for the researcher. As Levinas said in an 526 
interview: 527 
 528 
The intersubjective relation is a non-symmetrical relation. It is precisely as the 529 
relationship between the Other and me is not reciprocal that I am subjected to no 530 
Other; and I am “subject” essentially in this sense. It is I who support all. (Levinas, 531 
1985, p.95 in Benson and O’Neill, 2007, p.44).  532 
 533 
For Barnett (2005), this quotation signifies that responsibility is infinite. It is also non-534 
reciprocal because my responsibility does not rely on me expecting something back. Despite 535 
being a challenging ideal, a Levinasian ethic can usefully inform ethical possibilities when 536 
conducting fieldwork (Benson and O’Neill, 2007; Richardson-Ngwenya, 2012; Metro, 2014).  537 
 538 
In summary, Levinas wants us to overcome totality (the rejection or overlooking of 539 
difference) (Benson and O’Neill, 2007). The researcher should be affected by the 540 
interpersonal relationship and so become self-reflective. S/he ought to challenge (historical) 541 
power relations when exposed to asymmetry and discomfort. Ethical sensibilities cannot be 542 
anticipated; they emerge only through encounters in the field. Ethical demands on the 543 
researcher do not always come from the research design; strangers can make a call on the 544 
researcher. Ethics is more than just predefining the researcher’s ethical behaviour in the field; 545 
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it is an experience of awaiting the call of responsibility that leads the researcher to be affected 546 
by others (Benson and O’Neill, 2007).  547 
 548 
Being affected in the field by others means that research ethics committees should accept that 549 
their own ways of knowing and understanding, as well as the researcher’s, can be challenged. 550 
Instead of focusing on detailed pre-research descriptions of consent forms and review of 551 
methodologies, research ethics committees would play a more useful role in the ethical 552 
process if their attention shifted to a post-research scrutiny of the researcher’s responses to 553 
the many faces and voices of the research participants (perhaps messy, disorganised and 554 
contradictory) as encountered in the field. The unpredictability of the face-to-face encounter 555 
gets whitewashed away twice during the research process: first, during the institutional 556 
ethical-review process and, second, in the neat, cool, objective presentation and interpretation 557 
of the field notes and the interviews.  558 
 559 
Changing one’s research methodology is desirable, even essential, if circumstances in the 560 
field require it, such as working in another area if the weather changes or using a new source 561 
of information.  One might change one’s methods after discussions in the field: to overcome 562 
local objections to the original plan and so allow the research to proceed at all; to improve the 563 
range or quality of the information collected in ways not foreseen; or to take advantage of 564 
lines of enquiry or respondents unanticipated before the initial ethical review. So, changing 565 
one’s research methodology may be just pragmatism after meeting the research participants. 566 
There can be no guarantee they will acquiesce to the researcher’s approved plans. Klitzman 567 
and Appelbaum (2012) call for an audit of a sample of completed research projects to learn 568 
lessons from field practice. This is valuable but, we argue, is inadequate in scope (all projects 569 
should be reviewed afterwards and shown to be ethical) and inadequate philosophically 570 
(because changes in the field should go beyond what helps the researcher). Adopting 571 
Levinas’s ethical view adds a principle and not just pragmatism. If one adopts a Levinasian 572 
philosophy of a love for others, one is duty bound to make changes in research methods to 573 
meet the requirements of those to be researched. The meaning of abstract concepts such as 574 
consent, harm, autonomy, risk, research or benefit can be negotiated only through face-to-575 
face encounters in the field. The researcher can respond ethically only when s/he faces in the 576 
moment the unpredictable words and actions of others.   577 
 578 
A change to a pre-approved research plan – for whatever reason – strictly invalidates the 579 
initial ethical approval.  If the methodology in practice differs from that approved  the result 580 
is that, with only a one-stage ethical review procedure, the ethics committee cannot know 581 
whether the actual research was still ethical.  Neither do the research funder nor the publisher 582 
of the research results have the necessary ethical assurance, because they rely on the ethics 583 
committee.  Only a second-stage ethical review – after the research – can reinstate ethical 584 
confidence for all parties.  Additionally a post-research ethical check provides an extra 585 
disincentive to any researcher tempted to depart from the approved plan in ways that might 586 
go against the ethical principles that underpinned their pre-research ethical review.  The 587 
ethics committee’s ultimate sanction on research changed in the field in ways that are 588 
unethical is to deny the researcher the authority to publish the material gathered by 589 
unapproved means. 590 
 591 
The hard-pressed researcher might be concerned that an additional, post-research ethical 592 
review would add greatly to their workload.  It need not.  The only question the researcher 593 
would have to answer after the research had been completed would be whether the research 594 
departed materially from that approved.  If the answer is ‘no’, that concludes the post-595 
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research ethical check.  If the answer is ‘yes’, the researcher would be asked to describe the 596 
changes, justify them, and explain how the key ethical principles that informed the pre-597 
research review were also upheld in the revised methodology. The assurance of ethical 598 
probity cannot be secured by only a pre-research review. The process of post-research ethical 599 
review need not be administratively burdensome.  A post-research meeting between the 600 
researcher and the institutional ethics committee would be a learning experience for both as 601 
well as a clear reassurance to funders, publishers and the wider academic community.  Only 602 
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